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 SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act 
Whistleblower Immunity Provision: 
A Legislative History 
Peter S. Menell** 
ABSTRACT 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”) was the product of a 
multi-year effort to federalize trade secret protection. In the final stages of 
drafting the DTSA, Senators Grassley and Leahy introduced an important 
new element: immunity “for whistleblowers who share confidential infor-
mation in the course of reporting suspected illegal activity to law enforce-
ment or when filing a lawsuit, provided they do so under seal.” The mean-
ing and scope of this provision are of vital importance to enforcing health, 
safety, civil rights, financial market, consumer, and environmental protec-
tions and deterring fraud against the government, shareholders, and the 
public. This article explains how the whistleblower immunity provision 
was formulated and offers insights into its proper interpretation. 
  
                                                          
* Koret Professor of Law and Co-Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, University of 
California at Berkeley School of Law. This article grows out of a presentation that I made at a symposium 
hosted by the Center for Intellectual Property & Entrepreneurship and the Business, Entrepreneurship & 
Tax Law Review at the University of Missouri School of Law on March 17, 2017. I am grateful to 
Professor Dennis Crouch for organizing the symposium and Brittany Bruns and Amit Elazari for research 
assistance. I am especially grateful to the Senate Judiciary Committee staff for reaching out to me in 
drafting the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016. This article is largely based on Peter S. Menell, Tailoring 
a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2017). 
 
1
Menell: DTSA Whistleblower Immunity
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
No. 2] Menell: The DTSA Whistleblower Immunity Provision 399 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………….. 400 
II. PROLOGUE…………………………………………………………………… 401 
III. SUBVERSION OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION………………………............ 403 
IV. FORMULATING THE WHISTLEBLOWER IMMUNITY PROPOSAL……………… 407 
A. The Trade Secrecy/Law Enforcement Tension…………………………. 407 
B. The Interplay of Trade Secrecy and Whistleblowing…………………... 410 
C. Tailoring a Trade Secret Public Policy Exception…………………….. 416 
V. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DTSA WHISTLEBLOWER IMMUNITY PROVISION 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 419 
VI. INTERPRETING THE WHISTLEBLOWER IMMUNITY PROVISION……………… 425 
 
 
 
 
  
2
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss2/5
400 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 1 2017 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 11, 2016, President Barack Obama signed the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act (“DTSA”)1 into law.2 This historic legislation was the product of a multi-year 
effort to federalize trade secret protection.3 In the final stages of drafting the law, 
Senators Chuck Grassley and Patrick Leahy introduced an important new element: 
immunity “for whistleblowers who share confidential information in the course of 
reporting suspected illegal activity to law enforcement or when filing a lawsuit, 
provided they do so under seal.”4 
The meaning and scope of this provision are of vital importance to enforcing 
health, safety, civil rights, financial market, consumer, and environmental protec-
tions and deterring fraud against the government, shareholders, and the public. Un-
like other aspects of the DTSA, the whistleblower immunity provision emerged to-
ward the end of the legislative process and was not the subject of formal hearings.5 
Senator Leahy’s remarks on the Senate floor on the day that the Senate unanimously 
approved the DTSA summarize the provision’s rationale and note a source for its 
formulation: 
                                                          
 1. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376 (to be codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1836). 
 2. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at Signing of S. 
1890 – Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (May 11, 2016, 3:43 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/11/remarks-president-signing-s-1890-defend-trade-secrets-act-
2016. 
 3. See Victoria Espinel, Launch of the Administration’s Strategy to Mitigate the Theft of U.S. Trade 
Secrets, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES: BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013, 2:59 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/blog/2013/02/20/launch-administration-s-strategy-mitigate-theft-us-trade-secrets; THE 
COMM’N ON THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 1 (May 2013), 
http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_report_052213.pdf (“The scale of international 
theft of American intellectual property (IP) is unprecedented—hundreds of billions of dollars per year. . 
. .”); OFF. OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Se-
crets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection of Industrial Espionage 2009–
2011, (Oct. 2011), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-055.pdf (“Estimates 
from academic literature on the losses from economic espionage range . . . from $2 billion to $400 billion 
or more a year. . . .”); U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringe-
ment and Innovation Policies in the U.S. Economy xiv (May 2011), http://www.usitc.gov/publica-
tions/332/pub4226.pdf (estimating that in 2009, U.S. firms lost between $14.2 billion and $90.5 billion 
due to intellectual property infringement in China). Legislation to establish a federal civil cause of action 
for trade secret misappropriation dates back to 2012. See S. 3389, 112th Cong. (2012). Bills were offered 
in 2014 and 2015. See H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. 3326, 114th 
Cong. (2015). 
 4. Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee, Ex-
ecutive Business Meeting, U.S. SENATE (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/me-
dia/doc/012816%20Leahy%20Statement1.pdf [hereinafter Executive Business Meeting]; Press Release, 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Comm., Leahy-Grassley Amendment 
to Protect Whistleblowers Earns Unanimous Support in Judiciary Committee (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-grassley-amendment-to-protect-whistleblowers_earns-unani-
mous-support-in-judiciary-committee [hereinafter Press Release]. 
 5. In the most thorough analysis of the general legislative history of the DTSA, Research and In-
structional Services Librarian John Cannan merely summarized the whistleblower immunity provision. 
See John Cannan, A (Mostly) Legislative History of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, SSRN 26-27 
(May 4, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2775390. 
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Today, the Senate voted on legislation that will provide a valuable tool 
to protect against trade secret theft. This legislation is supported by busi-
nesses from diverse sectors of our economy, including companies large 
and small. . . . The Defend Trade Secrets Act contains a bipartisan provi-
sion I offered with Senator Grassley to ensure that employers and other 
entities cannot bully whistleblowers or other litigants by threatening them 
with a lawsuit for trade secret theft. The provision protects disclosures 
made in confidence to law enforcement or an attorney for the purpose of 
reporting a suspected violation of law and disclosures made in the course 
of a lawsuit, provided that the disclosure is made under seal. It requires 
employers to provide clear notice of this protection in any nondisclosure 
agreements they ask individuals to sign. This commonsense public policy 
amendment is supported by the Project on Government Oversight and the 
Government Accountability Project and builds upon valuable scholarly 
work by Professor Peter Menell.6 
This article explains how the whistleblower immunity provision was formu-
lated and offers insights into its proper interpretation. Before turning to the crafting 
of the provision, I retrace the scholarly journey that motivated the DTSA whistle-
blower immunity provision. 
II. PROLOGUE 
I begin with the story of Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, part of the inspiration for the 
whistleblower immunity provision. Dr. Wigand was a public health research scien-
tist who became one of the most famous whistleblowers in United States history.7 
He was the subject of a “mishandled” 60 Minutes episode8 that provided the basis 
for “The Insider,” a riveting motion picture exposing the tobacco industry’s efforts 
to suppress disclosure of its insidious efforts to increase the addictiveness of ciga-
rettes.9 
In 1989, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (“B&W”) hired Dr. Wig-
and, a Ph.D. biochemist, as Vice President of Research and Development.10 Dr. 
                                                          
 6. 162 CONG. REC. S1636-37 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy was 
referring to a draft of the article referenced in note *. The final version of that article faithfully reflects 
the text and analysis of the draft version that attracted the Senate Judiciary Committee’s attention. The 
only substantial change in the article was the addition of Part V, which summarizes the DTSA whistle-
blower immunity provision. The reason for this addition was that passage of the DTSA leapfrogged the 
publication process (the article was accepted in February 2015, several months before passage of the 
DTSA). Parts I–IV of the article, which provided the basis for the DTSA whistleblower immunity pro-
vision, were published as initially submitted apart from modest formatting edits so as to preserve a record 
of the foundation for the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision. 
 7. See Cassi Feldman, 60 Minutes’ Most Famous Whistleblower, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES 
OVERTIME (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-most-famous-whistleblower/ 
(quoting 60 Minutes Executive Producer Jeff Fager observing that “[t]he story itself was one of the most  
– probably the most important story that was ever reported by 60 Minutes.”); see also Marie Brenner, 
The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 1, 2004, 12:00 AM), https://www.vani-
tyfair.com/magazine/1996/05/wigand199605. 
 8. Feldman, supra note 7; Brenner, supra note 7. 
 9. See The Insider, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0140352/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2017). 
 10. See Brown & Williamson, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brown_%26_Williamson 
(last updated Nov. 2, 2017). 
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Wigand was led to believe that he would be developing a safer cigarette.11 In the 
course of his work, Dr. Wigand learned that the company was looking for ways to 
make cigarettes more addictive through nicotine-impact boosting—the use of am-
monia and other chemicals to enhance nicotine absorption in the lungs.12 Dr. Wig-
and’s unwillingness to support this effort ultimately led to his firing in March 
1993.13 Dr. Wigand believed that he was barred from disclosing confidential infor-
mation, including information pertaining to B&W’s efforts to make cigarettes more 
addictive, because he had signed a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”).14 
Dr. Wigand reassessed his adherence to the broad terms of the NDA after he 
became suspicious that B&W had sabotaged his efforts to find gainful employment. 
15 B&W’s filing of a breach of contract drove him to take action. Dr. Wigand cau-
tiously reached out to Andrew McGuire, a trauma prevention activist with whom 
he was acquainted.16 McGuire passed Dr. Wigand’s contact information along to 
Lowell Bergman, then a 60 Minutes investigative reporter,17 as a source for a pos-
sible story on cigarette and fire safety. Dr. Wigand reluctantly agreed to talk with 
Bergman and eventually became a paid consultant for a 60 Minutes episode on a 
fire-safe cigarette project at Phillip Morris.18 
In April 1994, tobacco company executives from B&W and other major ciga-
rette manufacturers testified before Congress that they believed that “nicotine is not 
addictive.”19 The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) contacted Dr. Wigand 
about the truth of the industry’s position.20 With Bergman’s encouragement, Dr. 
Wigand eventually agreed to disclose the industry’s dirty secrets about nicotine-
impact boosting on camera.21 
                                                          
 11. See id.; Brenner, supra note 7. 
 12. See Brenner, supra note 7; Brown & Williamson, supra note 10. 
 13. Brenner, supra note 7. 
 14. See Anatomy of a Decision: Facts and Context in the “60 Minutes” Decision Not to Air a Tobacco 
Industry Exposé, PBS: FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/smoke/cron.html (last vis-
ited Dec. 4, 2017). He later signed a more restrictive “nondisclosure settlement agreement.” Id. 
 15. See Brenner, supra note 7. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. The corporate machinations surrounding the 60 Minutes reporting about the tobacco industry 
ultimately led to Bergman’s departure. See Alex Berenson, ‘60 Minutes’ Producer Aims Bitter Blast at 
Ex-Colleague, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/04/us/60-minutes-pro-
ducer-aims-bitter-blast-at-ex-colleague.html. He now holds the Reva and David Logan Distinguished 
Chair in Investigative Journalism at the University of California at Berkeley. Lowell Bergman, UC 
BERKELEY: JOURNALISM, https://journalism.berkeley.edu/person/bergman/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2017). 
 18. See Brenner, supra note 7. The fire-safe cigarette project episode was itself the result of whistle-
blowing in the tobacco industry. Private Sector Whistleblowers: Are There Sufficient Legal Protec-
tions?: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Workforce Prot. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong. 
11 (2007) (statement of Jeffrey Wigand). Lowell Bergman had received a box with approximately 2,400 
Philip Morris documents from an anonymous source. Id. Bergman employed Dr. Wigand to interpret 
these technical documents, which revealed that Philip Morris had developed a fire-safe cigarette, but had 
chosen not to market it. Id. at 11–12. 
 19. See Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Chiefs Say Cigarettes Aren’t Addictive, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/15/us/tobacco-chiefs-say-cigarettes-aren-t-addictive.html; Regula-
tion of Tobacco Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on 
Commerce & Energy, 103d Cong. 628 (1994) (testimony of Messrs. Campbell, J. Johnston, Taddeo, 
Tisch, Horrigan, Sandefur, and D. Johnston). 
 20. See Brenner, supra note 7. 
 21. Id. 
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That summer, Dr. Wigand also became involved with several tobacco-related 
litigations,22 which raised the specter that B&W would seek to block disclosure of 
its confidential information. CBS’s General Counsel became concerned that B&W 
could sue CBS for tortious interference with contractual relations—namely B&W’s 
NDA with Dr. Wigand—if it aired an interview in which Dr. Wigand disclosed 
B&W trade secrets.23 
As feared, B&W pursued litigation seeking to bar Dr. Wigand from disclosing 
confidential information.24 Nonetheless, Dr. Wigand testified in a Mississippi suit 
in which the state sought reimbursement from the tobacco industry for the welfare 
and health care costs associated with illnesses arising from the use of tobacco prod-
ucts.25 This and parallel litigation in other states alleging claims for restitution and 
unjust enrichment on the basis of tobacco companies’ “wrongful conduct” and com-
mon law public nuisance26 ultimately resulted in settlements totaling hundreds of 
billions of dollars and bringing about substantial changes in the industry.27 
III. SUBVERSION OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION 
This story brought to light a disturbing misuse of trade secret protection. A 
major tobacco company subverted legal protections designed to promote socially 
beneficial innovation so as to maximize corporate profits at the expense of public 
health. As even a cursory examination of the history of corruption and fraud litiga-
tion reveals, such abuse has not been limited to a few bad actors or questionable 
industries. Many of the most significant public health and environmental problems, 
corrupt practices, and fraudulent activities—including the asbestos toxicity cover-
                                                          
 22. See id.; Henry Weinstein, Tobacco Whistle-Blower’s Star is Rising, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 1996), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-04-25/news/mn-62701_1_tobacco-industry; Michael Janofsky, Philip 
Morris Accuses ABC of Libel, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 1994), http://www.ny-
times.com/1994/03/25/us/philip-morris-accuses-abc-of-libel.html. 
 23. Brenner, supra note 7. 
 24. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 913 F. Supp. 530, 531 (W.D. Ky. 1996) 
(noting that B&W filed suit against Dr. Wigand on November 21, 1995 alleging theft, fraud, breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary and common law duties, and violation of the Kentucky Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act). 
 25. See Money & Investigating Update, WALL STREET J., https://online.wsj.com/public/re-
sources/MoneyInvesting/reference/bw.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2017); see also Hunt Helm, Blowing the 
Whistle on Big Tobacco: Wigand, Williams Lifted Secrecy’s Veil – Their Revelations Changed the His-
tory of the Tobacco Industry, COURIER-J. (May 25, 1997), http://archive.to-
bacco.org/News/970525helms.html. 
 26. See Mitchell L. Lothrop, Tobacco – Related Litigation: How It May Impact the World’s Insurance 
Industry, 3 CONN. INS. L. J. 305, 320–21 (1997). 
 27. John M. Broder, Cigarette Makers in a $368 Billion Accord to Curb Lawsuits and Curtail Mar-
keting, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/21/us/cigarette-makers-in-a-368-
billion-accord-to-curb-lawsuits-and-curtail-marketing.html. 
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up,28 the obesity crisis,29 evasion of environmental protection laws,30 fraud against 
the government,31 and Ponzi schemes32—have been hidden behind the veil of cor-
porate secrecy. These abuses have an institutional cause: NDAs functioning as a 
form of corporate omertà.33 Furthermore, some members of the defense bar have 
openly advocated the use of trade secret claims against current and former employ-
ees to discourage whistleblowing.34 
This pattern of abuse exposes a dark underside of trade secret protection. I have 
long been teaching a course surveying the principal modes of intellectual property 
protection: trade secret, patent, copyright, and trademark. Over the years, I became 
                                                          
 28. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 74 (1985) 
(concluding that for half a century asbestos manufacturers withheld and suppressed information about 
the risks to insulation workers from breathing asbestos fibers). 
 29. See Anahad O’Connor, How the Sugar Industry Shifted Blame to Fat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/well/eat/how-the-sugar-industry-shifted-blame-to-fat.html (re-
vealing documents showing that the sugar industry corrupted researchers in an effort to shift public 
opinion); see also Camila Donomske, 50 Years Ago, Sugar Industry Quietly Paid Scientists To Point 
Blame At Fat, NPR (Sept. 13, 2016, 9:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/09/13/493739074/50-years-ago-sugar-industry-quietly-paid-scientists-to-point-blame-at-fat; 
Cristin Kearns et al., Sugar Industry and Coronary Heart Disease Research: A Historical Analysis of 
Internal Industry Documents, 176 JAMA INTERN. MED. 1680, 1685 (2016). 
 30. See Nathaniel Rich, The Lawyer Who Became DuPont’s Worst Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/magazine/the-lawyer-who-became-duponts-worst-night-
mare.html (describing DuPont Corporation’s cover-up of a massive toxic pollution attributable to man-
ufacturing of Perfluorooctanoic (PFOA) acid, a chemical used producing its Teflon nonstick cookware 
products); see also Sharon Kelly, DuPont’s Deadly Deceit: The Decades-Long Cover-up Behind the 
“World’s Most Slippery Material”, SALON (Jan. 4, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://www.sa-
lon.com/2016/01/04/teflons_toxic_legacy_partner/; see also Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Engine-Rigging 
Scheme Said to Have Begun in 2008, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/10/05/business/engine-shortfall-pushed-volkswagen-to-evade-emissions-testing.html. 
 31. See generally CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
§ 2:9 (3d ed. 2016). 
 32. See HARRY M. MARKOPOLOS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER (2010). 
 33. The omertà refers to a code of silence, associated most commonly with the Mafia, used to hide 
criminal activity. NAT’L CRIME SYNDICATE, What Was The Code of Omertà?, http://www.na-
tionalcrimesyndicate.com/code-of-omerta/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2017). 
 34. See Carlton Fields, Employers Fight Back Against Whistleblowers, LEXOLOGY (July 2, 2014), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b2e89afd-6e2a-4310-9139-b94176e38e13 (noting that 
“[e]mployers may even have options against employees who have been successful in [False Claims Act 
(FCA) cases], but who have breached their employment agreements or who have stolen documents. 
Courts have recently been more willing to permit counterclaims against employee relators. Additionally, 
there is at least one case in which an employer filed suit against a whistleblower after losing a FCA 
case.”); see also Amanda Haverstick, Health Care Employers Take Note: New Weapons Are Available 
When Defending False Claims Act Suits, FORBES (June 20, 2014, 3:51 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2014/06/20/health-care-employers-take-note-new-
weapons-are-available-when-defending-false-claims-act-suits (reporting on cases allowing counter-
claims against whistleblowers for taking documents and observing that the “takeaway” for employers 
was that they have “more defense options in qui tam suits brought by employees who impermissibly 
disclose protected health information (PHI) or other confidential employer information”); see also Sa-
mantha P. Kingsbury & Karen S. Lovitch, Can a Relator be Held Liable for Using Confidential Company 
Documents to Support a Qui Tam Case?, HEALTH L. & POL’Y MATTERS (June 24, 2014), www.health-
lawpolicymatters.com/2014/06/24; see also Lisa M. Noller & Brandi F. Walkowiak, Holding Rogue 
Employees Accountable Under the FCA, FOLEY (Nov. 3, 2011, 1:29 PM), https://www.fo-
ley.com/files/Publication/6e6b9e4f-38f1-457a-a7ad-c331a0757194/Presentation/PublicationAttach-
ment/e45a77e2-8d6e-487b-80d3-c58826bdfd89/WCL36011-3-11.pdf; see also Corporate Crime: The 
Age of the Whistleblower, ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/busi-
ness/21679455-life-getting-better-those-who-expose-wrongdoing-companies-continue-fight (reporting 
that companies continue to fight back against those who expose wrongdoing, often against their own 
interests). 
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aware of an unusual gap in the trade secrets component of the course. Whereas the 
patent, copyright, and trademark regimes featured exceptions and limitations de-
signed to counterbalance social harm from overprotection—such as patent law’s 
misuse doctrine35 and various other limitations,36 copyright’s fair use doctrine37 and 
statutory licenses,38 and trademark law’s First Amendment limitations39—there 
were no analogous balancing limitations in trade secrets coverage. The Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”),40 on which the trade secrets laws in most states are 
based,41 lacks any public policy provision. My own casebook at the time,42 like 
others,43 overlooked this defect of trade secret protection. 
To explore this lacuna, I added some material from the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition relating to a public policy limitation on trade secret protection 
to my spring 2015 intellectual property course.44 For the final examination, I for-
mulated the following question to test students’ policy analysis skills: 
PART III (60 minutes) 
To: Attorney, Congressional Research Service 
From: Senator Boxstein 
Re: Proposed Trade Secret “Public Policy” Safe Harbor 
                                                          
 35. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
 36. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012) (patent experimental use doctrine applicable to drug testing); id. § 
273(b) (patent prior user right); id. § 287(c) (bar against remedies for infringement of medical procedure 
patents by doctors and hospitals); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873) (exhaustion doctrine); 
Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340 (1863) (repair doctrine); Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 
1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (common law experimental use). 
 37. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 38. See id. § 108 (limitations on exclusive right to copy for archival copies for public libraries); id. § 
110 (public interest exceptions for exclusive right to publicly perform copyrighted works). 
 39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) (classic [descriptive] fair use); id. § 1125(c)(3) (trademark 
dilution exclusions for fair use [including nominative and descriptive fair use], news reporting, and non-
commercial use from trademark dilution); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 
302 (9th Cir. 1992) (nominative fair use). 
 40. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985). 
 41. All states except New York, North Carolina, and Massachusetts have adopted the UTSA. See 
Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?ti-
tle=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Dec. 3, 2017). North Carolina’s trade secret statute borrows 
heavily from the UTSA. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66–152 (West 2015). 
 42. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (6th ed. 2012) (lacking any discussion of the subversion of trade secret 
protection to discourage whistleblowing). This oversight has since been corrected. See PETER S. 
MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE – VOLUME I: PERSPECTIVES, TRADE SECRETS AND PATENTS 98–102 (2017). 
 43. See, e.g., DAVID L. LANGE, MARY LAFRANCE, GARY MYERS, & LEE ANN W. LOCKRIDGE, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 372–413 (4th ed. 2012) (overlooking the public pol-
icy limitation); MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 32–119 (4th 
ed. 2011) (same); SHUBHA GHOSH, RICHARD GRUNER, JAY P. KESAN & ROBERT I. REIS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY 7–71 (2007) 
(same). 
 44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (noting 
that trade secret protection can “implicate the interest in freedom of expression or advance another sig-
nificant public interest” and a “privilege is likely to be recognized . . . in connection with the disclosure 
of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to 
other matters of substantial public concern”). 
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Although many states have adopted a version of the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, there is growing interest in passing a broad federal trade se-
crets statute for several reasons: (1) to strengthen U.S. protection for intel-
lectual property by bringing trade secrets on par with patents, copyrights, 
and trademarks as a national, federal regime; (2) to address the growing 
tide of international trade secret theft by adding a robust “seizure” provi-
sion that would give federal courts power to enter ex parte seizure orders 
before trade secrets can leave the country; and (3) to promote a nationally 
uniform trade secrets regime—businesses wish to reduce the uncertainty 
of doing business in many states with different rules. 
While I generally support such legislation as a way to promote tech-
nological innovation, I worry that the focus on strengthening trade secret 
protections could exacerbate an existing problem of trade secret protec-
tion—the widespread use of non-disclosure agreements to deter employees 
and contractors from disclosing illegal and fraudulent activities to govern-
ment officials. For example, corporations routinely require employees to 
sign broad confidentiality agreements with sometimes excessive liqui-
dated damages provisions and arbitration clauses that restrict reporting 
wrongdoing to the government. If an individual faces a potential lawsuit 
for crushing liability (not to mention the costs of defending such a lawsuit 
and the adverse effects on future employment prospects) for disclosing in-
formation that could be considered a trade secret, he or she may not be 
willing to risk reporting information. I worry that a federal trade secret law 
will become a bigger cudgel to prevent whistleblowers from providing in-
formation about violations of law to the appropriate authorities. I would 
also like to see state trade secret laws blunted so as to avoid these undesir-
able effects on ferreting out illegal and fraudulent activities. 
I am considering proposing a “public policy” safe harbor to address 
these concerns. I anticipate that there will be substantial opposition to any 
“public policy” limitation on trade secret protection from the Chamber of 
Commerce and other pro-business groups. It is critical that we anticipate 
their concerns and address them in a balanced manner. 
Here is a sketch of what I have in mind: 
• Immunity from Liability for Confidential Disclosure of Trade Se-
cret Information to the Government: An individual who discloses 
information, either directly or through his or her lawyer, in confidence 
to a federal, state, or local government official, or files a lawsuit or 
initiates a proceeding filed under seal in connection with a whistle-
blower program, solely for the purpose of investigating a violation of 
law is not subject to suit under federal (or state) trade secret law for 
that disclosure. 
• Attorney-Client Privilege: This immunity extends to the whistle-
blower’s attorney so long as the attorney does not disclose or use the 
information outside of representing the whistleblower in reporting the 
alleged illegal conduct. 
• Exception: If the person disclosed or used the information for non-
law enforcement purposes, such as starting a competing business or 
discussing the information in the press, he or she cannot benefit from 
the safe harbor. 
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• Use of Trade Secret Information in Anti-Retaliation Lawsuits: A 
person bringing a lawsuit for retaliation by an employer for the report-
ing of a violation of law may share the trade secret information with 
their attorney and use the trade secret information in the court pro-
ceeding without violating federal (or state) trade secret law so long as 
they file the information under seal and do not disclose the infor-
mation except pursuant to court order. 
• Notice: All non-disclosure agreements must include notice of the pub-
lic policy safe harbor. Failure to include this notice shall make the 
agreement null and void. 
Please prepare a short memo (four to six paragraphs) addressing the 
pros and cons of the “public policy” safe harbor proposal. Feel free to sug-
gest any improvements, changes, or issues that should be considered. 
IV. FORMULATING THE WHISTLEBLOWER IMMUNITY PROPOSAL 
This foray into the social justice and public policy ramifications of trade secret 
law piqued my curiosity. I added exploration of a public policy exception to trade 
secret protection to my summer research agenda. In addition to tracing the history 
of trade secret protection, I embarked on a deep dive into the social science literature 
on whistleblowers and the personnel management literature on onboarding of em-
ployees.45 
A. The Trade Secrecy/Law Enforcement Tension 
The emergence and evolution of trade secret protection explained why state 
trade secrets statutes had not included a public policy limitation. The trade secrets 
regime emerged in response to the economic upheaval of the Industrial Revolution. 
Before the nineteenth century, an informal system of social norms afforded crafts-
men effective protection for most technological advances.46 Craftsmen passed along 
their trade knowledge to their apprentices with the understanding that the know-
how would be kept secret during the apprenticeship period. After this training, the 
apprentice was free to practice the trade. Custom, trade-guilds, and close-knit com-
munities reinforced these trust-based protections. 
The rise of factories and increased employee mobility during the Industrial 
Revolution eroded the small-scale, localized social norm system that had adequately 
safeguarded trade knowledge in the preindustrial age. Recognizing the need for 
commercial morality and technological progress in the rapidly industrializing econ-
omy,47 courts gradually developed a common law tort-based regime for protecting 
                                                          
 45. The discussion in this section summarizes the analysis in Menell, supra note *.  That article pro-
vides more detailed analysis and references for the summary that follows. 
 46. These protections were augmented by the patent system, which afforded protection for larger, 
discrete advances. 
 47. See Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 116 (Sup. Ct. 1892), aff’d sub nom. Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 29 N.Y.S. 1143 (Sup. Ct. 1894) (enjoining defendants’ competing venture 
on the ground that “[t]his is not legitimate competition, which it is always the policy of the law to foster 
and encourage, but it is contra bonos mores [against good morals], and constitutes a breach of trust 
which a court of law, and much less a court of equity, should not tolerate”). 
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trade secrets.48 Trade secret protection could encompass information that was not 
generally known to the public so long as the employer undertook reasonable pre-
cautions to preserve secrecy.49 This latter requirement brought NDAs into common 
practice. Failure to guard against disclosure of trade secrets by employees and con-
tractors would jeopardize trade secret protection. 
Thus, trade secret protection emerged and largely crystallized before the vast 
expansion of the government’s role in regulating economic activity.50 Over the 
course of the past century and a half—encompassing the Progressive, New Deal, 
Civil Rights, Environmental Protection, and Information Eras—the federal and 
state governments have assumed a much larger role in regulating product and ser-
vice markets, worker safety, civil rights, public health, the environment, securities 
markets, and information technologies.51 Moreover, the federal and state govern-
ments have taken on a much larger role as economic actors in the general econ-
omy,52 contracting with private enterprises for provision of goods and services,53 
providing health insurance,54 and funding research and development.55 Government 
spending across all levels of government has risen over the course of the twentieth 
century from about 7% of the gross domestic product to about 45%. 
This transformation expanded private enterprises’ responsibilities to comply 
with public health and safety, civil rights, environmental, consumer, and financial 
market regulations, meet contractual obligations with the government, and shoulder 
tax burdens. The federal and state governments enacted laws and established poli-
                                                          
 48. See Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, 
and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L. J. 441, 450–88 (2001); see 
also Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 525–27 (1837) (granting specific performance of a 
contractual agreement regarding the “exclusive use” of a secret method for making chocolate); see also 
MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2:3 (2013). The emerging law of trade secrets was collected 
in the Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
When the Restatement (Second) of Torts was published in 1979, the authors omitted sections 757 and 
758 on the grounds that the law of trade secrets had developed into an independent body of law that no 
longer relied on general principles of tort law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS div. 9, intro. n. 
(AM. LAW INST. 1979). As noted earlier, trade secrets were incorporated into the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 49. See Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. at 116. 
 50. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1196 
(1986) (prior to the mid-1880s, “[f]ederal agencies did not generally inspect, investigate, or monitor any 
significant business activity to protect against unreasonable risks . . . From a national perspective, com-
mercial affairs took place in a world without regulation.”). 
 51. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014); see also 
PHILLIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS 
OF REGULATION (2003); see also RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2006). 
 52. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L. J. 235, 267 (2003); 
see also Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards Regulation in the Network Age, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 179, 
201 (2009). 
 53. See GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman 
& Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
 54. How is Medicare Funded?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-medicare-
is-funded/medicare-funding.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2017); Financing & Reimbursement, 
MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/financing-and-reimbursement/ (last visited Dec. 
3, 2017). 
 55. Historical Trends in Federal R&D, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., 
https://www.aaas.org/page/historical-trends-federal-rd (last updated Oct. 11, 2017). 
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cies encouraging reporting of regulatory violations, fraud, and tax evasion. In addi-
tion, they enacted and strengthened laws encouraging citizens to come forward with 
information revealing fraud against the government.56 
As government regulations and compliance with government contracts increas-
ingly hit corporate bottom lines, many companies came to see trade secret protec-
tions as a tool not only to discourage commercial threats but also to manage expo-
sure to enforcement risks. Violations of regulatory requirements, environmental 
standards, civil rights laws, and military specifications of government contracts—
like corporate know-how and technological process advances—are not directly ob-
servable to the public or government regulators. By using NDAs to silence employ-
ees and contractors, companies could evade responsibility and control their expo-
sure to liability. Consequently, many companies came to see trade secrets as en-
compassing all confidential information within the enterprise, not just technological 
information that could provide commercial advantage. In this way, trade secret pro-
tection was subverted from its historical and intended purposes of promoting com-
mercial morality and technological progress. 
As my initial foray into the interplay of trade secret protection and whistle-
blowing revealed,57 courts recognize that disclosure of a trade secret protection for 
non-commercial purposes can “implicate the interest in freedom of expression or 
advance another significant public interest,”58 and developed a limited privilege to 
disclose trade secrets.59 This privilege, however, is murky. The Restatement (Third) 
of Unfair Competition notes that the exception: 
depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the nature 
of the information, the purpose of the disclosure, and the means by which 
the actor acquired the information. A privilege is likely to be recognized, 
for example, in connection with the disclosure of information that is rele-
vant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or 
to other matters of substantial public concern.60 
This framing offers relatively little clarity or assurance to prospective whistle-
blowers. At a minimum, its characterization as a defense that turns on a case-by-
case balancing of potentially subjective factors means that an employee or contrac-
tor who divulges proprietary information to the government could be sued for 
breach of an NDA. The prospective whistleblower would likely have to consult an 
                                                          
 56. SYLVIA, supra note 31, § 2:9. 
 57. See supra parenthetical explanation accompanying note 44. 
 58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 59. Re v. Horstmann, 1987 WL 16710, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 1987) (recognizing a privilege 
to disclose to law enforcement officials trade secrets relevant to criminal fraud that had been disclosed 
to the defendants in confidence, citing the former Restatement); JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, 
TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION AND EXPLOITATION (1998); JAGER, supra note 48, § 3:14; DAVID W. 
QUINTO & STUART H. SINGER, TRADE SECRETS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.02 (2d ed. 2012). The Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition notes that, “policies underlying the privilege are similar to those 
supporting the numerous state and federal ‘whistleblower’ statutes that prohibit retaliatory personnel 
actions by employers against employees who disclose violations to public officials.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 60. Id. 
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attorney, with the attendant costs, and face some exposure. Moreover, most pro-
spective whistleblowers will not even be aware of this exception to their NDA with-
out such a consultation. 
This inquiry begged the question: was this limited, murky privilege sufficient 
to overcome the strong forces suppressing whistleblowing by the relatively few key 
employees and contractors best positioned to uncover illegal activity? 
B. The Interplay of Trade Secrecy and Whistleblowing 
To analyze the effects of NDAs and trade secret law on whistleblowing, I 
turned to management and social science research on corporate onboarding prac-
tices, socialization within corporate environments, and whistleblowing. This re-
search revealed that potential whistleblowers face a gauntlet of legal impediments, 
indoctrination policies, financial risks, and workplace and social pressures discour-
aging reporting of illegal conduct.61 As the authors of an empirical study examining 
230 corporate fraud scenarios at large U.S. companies concluded, “[g]iven the costs 
[of whistleblowing], the surprising part is not that most employees do not talk, but 
that some talk at all.”62 These costs include not only litigation costs, but also damage 
to the whistleblowers’ future employment prospects. As the attorney for Jim Bing-
ham, a former accountant who successfully blew the whistle on Xerox, 63 observed, 
“Jim had a great career, but he’ll never get a job in Corporate America again.”64 
From their first day on the job, employees and contractors are introduced to an 
array of legal and institutional measures intended to dissuade them from disclosing 
information that could adversely affect their employer. Thereafter, many companies 
condition employees through carrots and sticks to place the company’s profitability 
above all else. Employees quickly come to realize the benefits of loyalty and the 
professional, social, psychological, and other consequences that befall those who 
dare to expose corporate misdeeds. Those employees who come forward typically 
experience a mix of specific, tangible economic harms as well as social ostraciza-
tion. 
The widespread use of broad NDAs plays a central role in creating an environ-
ment in which employees and contractors feel duty-bound to stay silent about illegal 
activity. To ensure compliance with trade secret law, companies routinely require 
that corporate employees and contractors sign an NDA before they can begin work. 
This process is typically handled by a human resources employee who explains the 
terms of the agreement. Many larger enterprises use formal orientation programs. 
Such meetings emphasize the importance of trade secrets to the company and the 
breadth of the NDA. Most employees and contractors do not seek or obtain inde-
pendent counsel. For the unsophisticated and the legally savvy alike, NDAs can be 
                                                          
 61. See Jamie Darin Prekert et al., Retaliatory Disclosure: When Identifying the Complainant Is an 
Adverse Action, 91 N.C. L. REV. 889, 928 (2013). 
 62. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2245 (2010). 
 63. James Bandler & Barbara Martinez, Ex-Xerox Whistleblower Bingham Could Get Boost From 
Settlement, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 2, 2002, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB101770190756960240; James Bandler & Mark Maremont, How Ex-Accountant Added Up to 
Trouble for Humbled Xerox, WALL STREET J. (June 28, 2001, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB993674133642973302. 
 64. Dyck et al., supra note 62, at 2245. 
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confusing, intimidating documents, and employees who sign them often lack any 
leverage to negotiate terms. 
The express terms of NDAs appear to bar whistleblowing. Aside from being 
formal and often fairly technical, most NDAs are broadly worded.65 They typically 
reference and bar the disclosure of every conceivable form of information that 
might be deemed confidential. Before the passage of the DTSA, NDAs did not men-
tion any public policy exception or justification for reporting confidential infor-
mation to law enforcement officials. 
Such blanket framing communicates that any disclosure of confidential infor-
mation to persons outside of the company would breach the agreement and thereby 
expose the employee or contractor to termination and liability for damages. Even 
though whistleblowers are unlikely to cause compensable damage by reporting il-
legal activity to the government or a lawyer, many will be discouraged by the strong 
terms of the NDA from even seeking outside counsel. They might reasonably infer 
from the NDA’s strict and broad terms that even explaining their concerns to an 
attorney could potentially breach the NDA. And based on the murkiness of the for-
mer public policy exception, cautious attorneys could not provide full assurance 
that the whistleblower will be shielded from liability. The safest course of action 
for NDA signatories was to never disclose information about the company’s busi-
ness practices. The end result, likely intended by the company, is that NDAs foster 
a culture of corporate loyalty and secrecy. 
Many companies reinforce the legal restrictions of NDAs with formal and in-
formal processes aimed at integrating employees into a corporate culture that dis-
courages both trade secret leaks and whistleblowing. For many companies, the 
                                                          
 65. Norman D. Bishara et al., An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive 
Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 43 (2015) (“[T]he majority of firms will seek the 
broadest possible restrictions.”). A commonly referenced NDA defines confidential information to in-
clude “all information or material that has or could have commercial value or other utility in the busi-
ness.” Rich Stim, Sample Confidentiality Agreement (NDA), NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-ency-
clopedia/sample-confidentiality-agreement-nda-33343.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2017); UCB Mfg., Inc. 
v. Tris Pharma, Inc., No. A-5095-10T2, 2013 WL 4516012, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 27, 
2013) (stating that the confidentiality provision at issue “is not limited in terms of time, space, or scope. 
Rather, it sets forth an exhaustive and non-exclusive list of information that [defendant] must refrain 
from disclosing. Many of the descriptions in that list ... are so vague as to encompass every phase of 
[defendant]’s work experience.”). The provision at issue in that case states: 
I shall not disclose to any person, either inside the Company to employees without a need to know, 
or outside the Company, or use at any time, either during or after termination of employment, 
except as required in my duties to the Company, any secret or confidential information, whether 
or not developed by me, unless I shall first obtain written consent of the President of the Company 
or unless such information shall have become general public knowledge by any means other than 
disclosure by me. Secret or confidential information shall include, but not be limited to, acquisition 
or merger negotiations or information, know-how, designs, formulas, processes, devices, ma-
chines, inventions, research or development projects, plans for future development, materials of a 
business nature, financial data, legal documents and records, trade secrets, processes, formula data, 
techniques, know-how, improvements, inventions, marketing plans, strategies, forecasts, pricing 
information, customer information, work procedures, personnel and labor relations information, 
product specifications, financial information, models, blueprints, drawings, vendor information, 
proprietary information of other persons that has been disclosed to the Company and any other 
information of a similar nature in a form or to the extent not available to the public. 
Id. at *3. The New Jersey appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of a pharmaceutical 
employee on the ground that the NDA was unenforceable due to its over breadth. Id. at *1. Such chal-
lenges, however, are exceedingly rare. 
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NDA signing occurs during a comprehensive and meticulously planned “onboard-
ing” process aimed at inculcating loyalty and corporate pride among new employ-
ees.66 This process can extend for months or even years.67 The goal—or, at the least, 
one of the foremost goals—is to begin to mold everyday workers into fiercely loyal 
employees who will align their own interest with that of the company. 
Once employees are onboarded, many firms reinforce loyalty through internal 
branding.68 These efforts can be in the form of training sessions, expanded compen-
sation opportunities based on employee engagement, and specifically focused eval-
uation criteria. The overarching goal is to create lasting bonds between the company 
and its workers such that employees align their thinking with that of the owners of 
the firm.69 Some of these programs have been compared to religious conversions or 
indoctrinations into cults.70 
Those employees and contractors that report what they believe to be illegal 
activity face an uncertain, time-consuming, and costly legal challenge. Although 
various whistleblower laws ostensibly protect employees from retaliation for re-
porting alleged violations of law to the government,71 none prior to the DTSA ex-
pressly immunized whistleblowers who breach NDAs by reporting illegal activity 
to the government from trade secret liability. 
While several cases have recognized a public policy protecting such whistle-
blowers,72 the contours of the defense are unclear. Courts use balancing tests to 
                                                          
 66. TALYA N. BAUER, SHRM FOUND., ONBOARDING NEW EMPLOYEES: MAXIMIZING SUCCESS 9 
(2011),  https://www.shrm.org/foundation/ourwork/initiatives/resources-from-past-initiatives/Docu-
ments/Onboarding%20New%20Employees.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (reporting that 93% of organ-
izations use a new employee orientation program). 
 67. Id. at 2 (highlighting Zappos’s “intensive” onboarding course that lasts for five weeks and 
L’Oreal’s two-year process). 
 68. Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179, 1184 
(2010) (“[M]anagement theorists and business consultants recommend that firms invest at least as much 
in internal marketing to employees – that is, selling the corporate brand inside the firm – as they do in 
external advertising campaigns directed at consumers. By managing employees’ identities and aligning 
them with the firm’s brand, employers can nurture an emotional attachment to the firm that yields a 
significant payoff in employee loyalty and productivity, and, ultimately, in customer satisfaction and 
loyalty.”). 
 69. Id. at 1200 (“Employees are persuaded to internalize brand values through a systemic recruiting, 
training, development, and compensation program that fosters a psychological commitment to the firm 
and a ‘consciousness of kind’ that translates into deeper attachment to the firm. The goal is to produce a 
workforce that reacts and behaves instinctively ‘on-brand,’ effectively managing itself.”). 
 70. Id. at 1212–15 (discussing internal branding efforts at Southwest Airlines and Disney) (“Disney 
carefully strips away other sources of identity that have negligible job relevance . . . inculcat[ing] its own 
special language designed to shape workers’ attitudes toward service in a way that furthers the Disney 
brand . . . “). Id. at 1214; see also Peter Waldman, Motivate or Alienate? Firms Hire Gurus to Change 
Their ‘Culture’, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 1987), http://www.ex-cult.org/Groups/Landmark/landmark-cher-
ries.dir/apostate/lecarchive/corptng2.htm (“Although the efforts to transform corporate ‘cultures’ vary 
widely among companies, many of the programs draw heavily from motivational themes popularized by 
entrepreneurs like L. Ron Hubbard and Werner Erhard. Indeed, most of the programs share a common, 
simple goal: to increase productivity by converting worker apathy into corporate allegiance.”). 
 71. See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2012); Scott L. Silver & Janine D. Garlitz, SEC 
Whistleblower Incentives Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, 18 PIABA B. J. 169, 171-72 
(2011). 
 72. See U.S. ex rel. Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 (Cal. Cir. 2012); U.S. ex rel. 
Head v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2009); U.S. ex rel. Grandeau v. Cancer Treatment 
Ctrs. of Am., 350 F. Supp. 2d 765, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
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assess whether an exception should apply in a particular case.73 The factors to be 
balanced vary and can be subjective. 
Not only do differing tests lead to uncertain consequences for the whistleblow-
ers who risk their livelihoods,74 but the application of any balancing test, as opposed 
to a clear safe harbor, is itself problematic. Most whistleblowers considering report-
ing information about misconduct to the government are not represented by counsel 
when they need to decide what information to provide the government and are not 
in a position to anticipate how a court in an undetermined jurisdiction will evaluate 
those choices. Even if the whistleblower is represented by counsel, the lawyer will 
often be hard-pressed to provide definitive advice. 
The decisions in Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems,75 serve as a cau-
tionary tale of the risks that whistleblowers face. While working as a Chief Scientist 
at General Dynamics C4 Systems (“GDC4S”), a government aerospace contractor, 
Mary Cafasso became aware of corporate decisions that she believed to be in vio-
lation of the company’s obligations under its government contracts.76 She reported 
these concerns internally, but her warnings went unheeded.77 Upon learning that her 
position was being eliminated, she hurriedly downloaded a large number of confi-
dential files that could support her suspicions.78 GDC4S learned of Cafasso’s re-
moval of proprietary documents and filed suit against her in state court for breach 
of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and conversion.79 Shortly thereafter, 
Cafasso filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).80 GDC4S then 
asserted counterclaims in the federal action based on breach of the NDA, misappro-
priation of trade secrets, conversion, and other claims based on her removal of com-
puter files as part of her qui tam action.81 
After granting summary judgment in favor of GDC4S on Cafasso’s FCA ac-
tion, the district court turned to GDC4S’s counterclaims.82 The court readily deter-
mined that Cafasso’s disclosure of the documents in question to her attorney con-
stituted a breach of her NDA.83 The court rejected a public policy privilege, noting 
that: 
                                                          
 73. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011); JDS Uniphase 
Corp. v. Jennings, 473 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702 (E.D. Va. 2007); Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action 
Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[C]ourts have required that the employee conduct be rea-
sonable in light of the circumstances, and have held that ‘the employer’s right to run his business must 
be balanced against the rights of the employee to express his grievances and promote his own welfare.”) 
(internal citation omitted); see also X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff’d sub nom. 
Under Seal v. Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994) (using a balance-of-hardship test when deciding 
whether to grant a preliminary injunction against the disclosure of documents by former in-house counsel 
filing qui tam claim). 
 74. See Joel D. Hesch, The False Claims Act Creates a “Zone of Protection” that Bars Suits Against 
Employees Who Report Fraud Against the Government, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 367 (2014). 
 75. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics Sys., Inc., No. CV06-1381-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 1457036 (D. 
Ariz. May 21, 2009). 
 76. Id. at *2–3. 
 77. Id. at *3–4. 
 78. Id. at *5–6. 
 79. Id. at *8. 
 80. “‘Qui tam’ is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte 
sequitur, which means ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.’” Vt. 
Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000) (citing 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160). 
 81. Cafasso, 2009 WL 1457036, at *8. 
 82. Id. at *13. 
 83. Id. at *13–15. 
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[p]ublic policy does not immunize Cafasso. Cafasso confuses protecting 
whistleblowers from retaliation for lawfully reporting fraud with immun-
izing whistleblowers for wrongful acts made in the course of looking for 
evidence of fraud. The limitation of statutory protection for retaliation to 
“lawful acts done by the employee” weighs against any inference of a 
broad privilege for Cafasso to breach her contract with GDC4S. Statutory 
incentives encouraging investigation of possible fraud under the FCA do 
not establish a public policy in favor of violating an employer’s contractual 
confidentiality and nondisclosure rights by wholesale copying of files ad-
mittedly containing confidential, proprietary, and trade secret infor-
mation.84 
The court granted GDC4S summary judgment on its breach of contract claim.85 
It also held that Cafasso’s actions caused irreparable harm and were not immunized 
by the FCA.86 The court ordered Cafasso to pay $300,000 in attorneys’ fees for the 
breach of contract action.87 
The court rejected Cafasso’s argument that such an award could deter future 
qui tam plaintiffs from pursuing claims on the ground that: 
Cafasso’s claims under the False Claims Act and GDC4S’s breach of con-
tract claims and counterclaims do not have a reciprocal relationship. The 
award poses no threat to False Claims Act plaintiffs who perform a rea-
sonable inquiry into the facts and law underlying their claim and avail 
themselves of the discovery under the law.88 
Yet the breach of contract action was based in substantial part on Cafasso’s 
disclosure to her attorney of the proprietary documents on which she based her qui 
tam action.89 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court rulings.90 The court declined to 
adopt a public policy exception in a case involving “vast and indiscriminate appro-
priation” of confidential files, even for the purpose of reporting allegedly illegal 
activity to her attorney and to the government.91 The court emphasized the over-
breadth of the document retrieval, notwithstanding that Cafasso was under tremen-
dous time pressure in gathering the documents.92 The court expressed concern about 
the sensitivity of the information, yet it was all information that Cafasso was au-
thorized to view.93 Cafasso limited disclosure to her attorney (who was also duty-
                                                          
 84. Id. at *14. 
 85. Id. at *15. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., No. CV06-1381-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 3723087, at *4-9. 
(D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2009), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). The court reduced the award of $575,415 
to $300,000 as a result of the “possibility of extreme hardship” and Cafasso having devoted over 5,000 
hours during the prior three years to the litigation and the depletion of her savings. Id. 
 88. Id. at *7. 
 89. Cafasso, 2009 WL 1457036, at *13. 
 90. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 91. Id. at 1062. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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bound to protect the information) and the government through a sealed qui tam fil-
ing.94 Nevertheless, the court concluded that: 
[a]n exception broad enough to protect the scope of Cafasso’s massive 
document gather in this case would make all confidentiality agreements 
unenforceable as long as the employee later files a qui tam action. See JDS 
Uniphase Corp. v. Jennings, 473 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702 (E.D. Va. 2007) 
(“[E]mployees would feel free to haul away proprietary documents, com-
puters, or hard drives, in contravention of their confidentiality agreements, 
knowing they could later argue they needed the documents to pursue suits 
against employers. . . .”). Were we to adopt a public policy exception to 
confidentiality agreements to protect relators—a matter we reserve for an-
other day—those asserting its protection would need to justify why re-
moval of the documents was reasonably necessary to pursue an FCA 
claim. Cafasso has made no such particularized showing.95 
Such a “particularized showing” puts whistleblowers in the difficult position 
of having to carefully screen documents, often under extreme time pressure and 
otherwise stressful circumstances. A whistleblower will not necessarily know what 
documents they will need to support a claim, and documents can be evanescent—
disappearing if they are not preserved. 
In another case that recognized a public policy exception for whistleblowers, 
the district court nonetheless allowed a counterclaim to go forward. In Siebert v. 
Gene Security Network, Inc., the court cited Cafasso and concluded that enforcing 
a confidentiality agreement to suppress evidence of fraud would frustrate Con-
gress’s intent in enacting the FCA—to encourage whistleblowing.96 However, the 
court allowed the parties to determine through discovery if the relator took docu-
ments unrelated to the FCA claim.97 But the prospect of potentially prevailing 
against a counterclaim—requiring a nonlawyer relator to establish that documents 
are “relevant” to a false claim—is little solace to a person contemplating reporting 
alleged wrongdoing to the government. Having to respond to discovery, retain 
counsel, and face possible liability would discourage many whistleblowers from 
reporting at all. 
The net effect of corporate onboarding policies, broad NDAs, and murky legal 
standards for determining whether an employee or contractor who seeks to report 
allegedly illegal activities to the government is to place potential whistleblowers in 
a Catch-22.98 While there are potential defenses to breach of contract and trade se-
cret claims against whistleblowers who use proprietary information for reporting 
allegedly illegal activity, the prospect of having to hire a lawyer to defend against 
such claims has a significant deterrent effect on whistleblowers. As the Cafasso 
case illustrates, the act of sharing the allegedly incriminating information with an 
                                                          
 94. Id. at 1052. 
 95. Id. at 1062. 
 96. See Siebert v. Gene Sec. Network, No. 11-cv-01987, 2013 WL 5645309, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 
2013). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Drawing on the clever plot device employed repeatedly in Joseph Heller’s 1961 blockbuster novel 
of the same name, a “Catch-22” is “a problematic situation for which the only solution is denied by a 
circumstance inherent in the problem or by a rule.” Catch-22, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/catch%2022 (last visited Dec. 5, 2017). 
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attorney who is duty-bound to maintain the proprietary status of trade secret infor-
mation can expose the whistleblower to liability,99 even though the very test for 
assessing availability of a public policy defense requires the careful assessment that 
lawyers are uniquely qualified to provide. 
It became clear that routine NDAs that are essential to safeguarding trade se-
crets can be subverted to chill those in the best position to reveal illegal activity. I 
next turned my attention to finding a solution to this problem that did not undermine 
the protection of trade secrets that promote commercial morality and technological 
progress. 
C. Tailoring a Trade Secret Public Policy Exception 
I came to realize that there were two keys to solving the trade secrecy/whistle-
blower puzzle. First, the empirical studies show that most whistleblowers are not 
interested in undermining an employer’s lawful commercial advantage. They are 
not seeking to divulge a company’s innovative process technology to competitors. 
Nor are they seeking to compete with the employer. Rather, they are driven by moral 
and social desires to prevent, halt, or rectify illegal activity. They seek to promote 
the social good, not something that is inconsistent with the guiding principles of 
trade secret protection: commercial morality and technological advance. It is ironic 
that a legal regime grounded in promoting commercial morality has stood in the 
way of ferreting out illegal activity. Such misconduct undermines commercial and 
social morality. 
Second, existing confidentiality rules within the legal profession100 and gov-
ernment institutions provide safeguards against disclosure of trade secrets by attor-
ney and government officials. Government agencies routinely deal with trade se-
crets and follow strict rules for ensuring that this information remains confiden-
tial.101 The Freedom of Information Act exempts trade secrets from public disclo-
sure.102 More generally, the federal government holds federal officers and employ-
ees strictly accountable for disclosing trade secrets to the public without authoriza-
tion. The Trade Secrets Act provides that: 
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any de-
partment or agency thereof . . . publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes 
                                                          
 99. See supra text accompanying notes 84–85. 
 100. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978) (observing that “[t]he attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal ele-
ment of the modern American lawyer’s professional functions.”). Attorneys representing whistleblowers 
are especially cognizant of the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of trade secrets. The FCA 
requires that complaints be filed “under seal for at least [sixty] days, and shall not be served on the 
defendant until the court so orders.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012). The seal enables the government to 
investigate the allegations without tipping off the defendant. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 24 (1986), as re-
printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5289. 
 101. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.A. § 122 (West 2013) (requiring the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office to main-
tain trade secrecy of patent applications); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(j) 
(West 2016) (requiring the Food and Drug Administration to maintain trade secrecy during its review of 
drugs); 7 C.F.R. § 200.83(c)(1) (2008) (requiring the SEC to respect confidential business information); 
see generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking a Balance: When Should Trade-Secret Law Shield Disclosures 
to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 798–818 (2011) (surveying government policies safeguard-
ing trade secrets). 
 102. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3)–(4) (West 2016). 
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known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any infor-
mation coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties 
or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report 
or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or 
employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade se-
crets . . . shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one 
year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.103 
Furthermore, trade secret owners whose trade secrets have been violated by 
improper government disclosure can pursue compensatory damages through an ac-
tion filed with the U.S. Court of Claims.104 
Thus, reporting of allegedly illegal activity by employees and contractors sub-
ject to NDAs can be reconciled with the protection of trade secret law by immuniz-
ing whistleblowers from trade secret liability so long as they maintain the secrecy 
of confidential information. This can be accomplished by authorizing individuals 
subject to NDAs to share confidential information with what I refer to as “trusted 
intermediaries”: government officials and attorneys legally bound to safeguard pro-
prietary information. Thus, disclosure of even substantial amounts of proprietary 
information to a trusted intermediary—an attorney, court, or government official—
does not jeopardize trade secrecy. 
Such a regime enables potential whistleblowers to obtain legal advice without 
risk of liability for trade secret misappropriation. It also provides government en-
forcers with access to critical information about compliance with the law, govern-
ment contracts, and other vital areas of public concern. 
My research demonstrated the critical importance of affording potential whis-
tleblowers with a clear safe harbor that would not expose them to the costs and risks 
of trade secret litigation. As the Cafasso case illustrated,105 having to defend a trade 
secret misappropriation case threatens crushing liability. Apart from disclosing 
trade secrets to her attorney and the government under seal, the defendant in that 
case maintained the secrecy of the confidential information at issue.106 Yet, the case 
resulted in costly litigation.107 
Therefore, I proposed that Congress immunize potential whistleblowers from 
liability, not merely codify a defense to liability. As prior case law establishes, an 
immunity from suit affords a defendant the ability to resolve litigation as early in 
the litigation as possible. The Supreme Court and all circuit courts that have ad-
dressed the procedural requirements of qualified immunity issues have held that the 
                                                          
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012). 
 104. See Demodulation, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 794, 813 (2012); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding that that trade secrets constitute property interests pursuant to the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and finding that the EPA effected a taking of private property 
requiring just compensation where the agency used, pursuant to statute, confidential studies submitted 
by one pesticide manufacturer in evaluating similar pesticides submitted for approval by another manu-
facturer). 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 75–79, 81–95. 
 106. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics Sys., Inc., No. CV06-1381-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 1457036, at *13 (D. 
Ariz. May 21, 2009). 
 107. Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., No. CV06-1381-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 3723087, at *4–9. 
(D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2009), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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immunity issue should be determined “at the earliest possible stage of the litiga-
tion.”108 Furthermore, interlocutory appeals are generally available for immunities, 
but not defenses.109 
In addition, it is essential that potential whistleblowers have notice of this im-
munity, so they do not mistakenly interpret the broad NDA language as barring their 
discussing what they believe to be illegal activity with counsel and reporting of 
confidential information to the government through a confidential communication. 
My ultimate proposed whistleblower immunity provision closely paralleled the 
spring 2015 exam question that inspired this project: 
i.  Immunity from Liability for Confidential Disclosure of Trade Se-
cret Information to the Government: An individual who discloses in-
formation, either directly or through an attorney, in confidence to a federal, 
state, or local government official, or files a lawsuit or initiates a proceed-
ing filed under seal in connection with a whistleblower program, solely for 
the purpose of investigating a violation of law is not subject to suit under 
federal or state trade secret law for that disclosure. 
1. Attorney Immunity: This immunity extends to the whistleblower’s 
attorney so long as the attorney does not disclose or use the information 
outside of representing the whistleblower in reporting the alleged illegal 
conduct. 
2. Exception: This immunity does not apply to persons who disclose or 
use the information for non-law enforcement purposes, such as starting 
a competing business or communicating the trade secret information to 
the press. 
ii.  Use of Trade Secret Information in Anti-Retaliation Lawsuit: A 
person bringing a lawsuit for retaliation by an employer for reporting any 
violation of law including fraud against the government may disclose the 
                                                          
 108. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (“[Q]ualified immunity questions should be 
resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation.”); Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 25 F.3d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 
1994); Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 177 F.3d 1042, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1999); 
X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 65–67 (2d Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 
300 (3d Cir. 2006); Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648–49 (5th Cir. 2012); Skousen v. Brighton High 
Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 526–27 (6th Cir. 2002); Landstrom v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 892 
F.2d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 1990); Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 791 (8th Cir. 2015); Little v. City of 
Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988); Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1280–81 (11th 
Cir. 1998). Similarly, circuit courts addressing the procedures appropriate for adjudicating sovereign 
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1609, have consistently dictated 
procedures that ensure that the immunity issue is decided early in the litigation. See In re Papandreou, 
139 F.3d 247, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Filus v. Lot Polish Airlines, 907 F.2d 1328, 1332 (2d Cir. 1990); 
Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 849 (5th Cir. 2000); Rubin v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 795 (7th Cir. 2011); Alpha Therapeutic Corp. v. Nippon Hoso Kyokai, 
199 F.3d 1078, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn sub nom. Alpha Therapeutic Corp. v. Kyokai, 237 
F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001); Hansen v. PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero), TBK, 601 F.3d 1059, 1063–
64 (10th Cir. 2010); Butler v. Sukhoi Co., 579 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 109. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014) (“[P]retrial orders denying qualified immunity 
generally fall within the collateral order doctrine.”). 
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trade secret information to their attorney and use the trade secret infor-
mation in the court proceeding so long as they file the information under 
seal and do not disclose the information except pursuant to court order. 
iii. Notice: All non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) must include reason-
able notice of the public policy safe exception set forth in clauses (i) and 
(ii). Notice of clauses (i) and (ii) in NDAs is a prerequisite for enforcing 
these agreements in federal courts. Failure to provide notice of the public 
policy exception shall bar recovery of exemplary damages and attorneys’ 
fees in any trade secret misappropriation action. 
V. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DTSA WHISTLEBLOWER 
IMMUNITY PROVISION 
I completed a draft of “Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret 
Protection” in early November 2015, just as I was heading to Washington, D.C. for 
an annual patent law conference that I co-organize with Georgetown University 
Law Center (“GULC”).110 I uploaded the trade secret article on the Social Science 
Research Network website111 just before heading to the airport. 
As I stepped down from the stage after moderating the opening panel of the 
GULC-BCLT (Berkeley Center for Law & Technology) Seventh Annual Patent 
Law and Policy Conference, I was greeted by a member of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee staff. She asked if I had a few minutes to discuss some pending legisla-
tion. I asked her what aspects of patent reform she had in mind. To my surprise, she 
said that she was interested in discussing the DTSA. I learned that the DTSA was 
moving through the legislative process, Senators Leahy and Grassley were inter-
ested in addressing the whistleblower problem, and the Senate Judiciary Committee 
staff was intrigued by the approach set forth in my draft article. We exchanged email 
addresses and agreed to communicate the following week. 
Within a few days of the GULC-BCLT Patent Law Conference, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee staff vetted a whistleblower immunity provision modeled on 
the proposal in my article among DTSA stakeholders. In early January 2016, I for-
warded a commentary that I had posted on Columbia Law School’s Blue Sky 
Blog.112 The Judiciary Committee provided me with a draft of the whistleblower 
immunity amendment that Senators Leahy and Grassley planned to introduce later 
that month. The language implemented nearly verbatim, the core elements of my 
proposal. I was especially pleased to see that staff had framed the provision as “im-
munity” from liability and not merely a defense to liability. We discussed ensuring 
that the provision applied to anyone, whether an employee or a contractor, who 
signs an NDA. 
                                                          
 110. See The Seventh Annual Patent Law and Policy Conference, GEO. L. (Nov. 6, 2015), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/continuing-legal-education/programs/academic-conferences/patent-
law.cfm. 
 111. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, SSRN (Nov. 
5, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686565. 
 112. See Peter S. Menell, Deterring Corporate Fraud from the Inside: Encouraging Whistleblowing 
Without Jeopardizing Trade Secrecy, COLUM. L. SCH.: BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/01/12/deterring-corporate-fraud-from-the-inside-encourag-
ing-whistleblowing-without-jeopardizing-trade-secrecy/. 
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On January 28, 2016, the Senate Judiciary Committee convened to consider the 
DTSA.113 After Senator Orrin Hatch introduced a substitute version of the DTSA, 
Senator Leahy introduced a whistleblower immunity amendment co-authored by 
Senator Grassley: 
SEC. __. IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR CONFIDENTIAL 
DISCLOSURE OF A TRADE SECRET TO THEGOVERNMENT 
OR IN A COURT FILING. 
(a) AMENDMENT.—Section 1833 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘This chapter’’ and inserting 
(a) IN GENERAL.—This chapter”; 
(2) in subsection (a)(2), as designated by paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘the 
reporting of a suspected violation of law to any governmental entity of 
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, if such 
entity has lawful authority with respect to that violation’’ and inserting 
‘‘the disclosure of a trade secret in accordance with subsection (b)’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
(b) IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR CONFIDENTIAL 
DISCLOSURE OF A TRADE SECRET TO THE GOVERNMENT OR 
IN A COURT FILING.— 
(1) IMMUNITY.—An individual shall not be held criminally or civilly 
liable under any Federal or State trade secret law for the disclosure of a 
trade secret that— 
(A) is made— 
(i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, 
either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and 
(ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected 
violation of law; or 
(B) is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or 
other proceeding, if such filing is made under seal. 
(2) USE OF TRADE SECRET INFORMATION IN ANTI-
RETALIATION LAWSUIT.—An individual who files a lawsuit for re-
taliation by an employer for reporting a suspected violation of law may 
disclose the trade secret to the attorney of the individual and use the trade 
secret information in the court proceeding, if the individual— 
(A) files any document containing the trade secret under seal; and 
(B) does not disclose the trade secret, except pursuant to court order. 
(3) NOTICE.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—An employer shall provide notice of the immun-
ity set forth in this subsection in any contract or agreement with an 
employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential 
information. 
(B) POLICY DOCUMENT.—An employer shall be considered to be 
in compliance with the notice requirement in subparagraph (A) if the 
employer provides a cross-reference to a policy document provided to 
                                                          
 113. See Comm. on the Judiciary, Executive Business Meeting, U.S. SENATE (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/executive-business-meeting-01-28-16. 
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the employee that sets forth the employer’s reporting policy for a sus-
pected violation of law. 
(C) NON-COMPLIANCE.—If an employer does not comply with the 
notice requirement in subparagraph (A), the employer may not be 
awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees under subparagraph (C) 
or (D) of section 1836(b)(3) in an action against an employee to whom 
notice was not provided. 
(D) APPLICABILITY.—This paragraph shall apply to contracts and 
agreements that are entered into or updated after the date of enactment 
of this subsection. 
(4) EMPLOYEE DEFINED.—For purposes of this subsection, the term 
‘employee’ includes any individual performing work as a contractor or 
consultant for an employer. 
(5) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Except as expressly provided for 
under this subsection, nothing in this subsection shall be construed to 
authorize, or limit liability for, an act that is otherwise prohibited by law, 
such as the unlawful access of material by unauthorized means.”. 
(c) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1838 
of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking “This chapter” and 
inserting “Except as provided in section 1833(b), this chapter.”114 
Senators Leahy, Grassley, and Diane Feinstein explained the amendment in the 
following discussion: 
Senator Leahy: “My amendment along with Senator Grassley ensures 
that companies do not intimidate whistleblowers by threatening them with 
laws for trade secret theft. Now Senator Grassley and I have worked to-
gether for years and years on whistleblower efforts and I am glad to con-
tinue the work. I have two letters of support that I would like to include for 
the record from the supporter groups.” 
Senator Grassley: “[They] will be included.” 
Senator Leahy: “[The amendment] is carefully written to ensure that the 
disclosures are protected or that they are made to law enforcement in con-
fidence or filed with a court under seal. They do not protect unlawful ac-
tivities. I think that it is a good amendment and I would move its adoption. 
Senator Grassley: “And I have a statement in favor [of the amendment] 
that I will put in the record without objection. Those in favor of the amend-
ment . . . 
Senator Feinstein: “May I say one thing about this amendment.” 
Senator Grassley: “Yes, please.” 
                                                          
 114. See S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2016) (proposed amendment to Chapter 90 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Leahy-Grassley1%20-%20ALB16037.pdf. In addi-
tion, Senator Leahy submitted a statement into the record stating in pertinent part: 
I appreciate that the bill’s sponsors worked with me to improve this legislation, which is critical for 
Vermont businesses. I also thank Chairman Grassley for working with me on an amendment to provide 
needed protections for whistleblowers who share confidential information in the course of reporting 
suspected illegal activity to law enforcement or when filing a lawsuit, provided they do so under seal. 
Our amendment is supported by the Government Accountability Project and the Project on Government 
Oversight (POGO), and I look forward to its adoption. 
Executive Business Meeting, supra note 4. 
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Senator Feinstein: “I think that this amendment is really important. As I 
understand it, it doesn’t mean that the person is protected for actions that 
are otherwise prohibited by law, such as hacking. And I think that it is 
important for the record to point out.”115 
The letters of support were submitted by the Project on Government Oversight 
(“POGO”)116 and the Government Accountability Project (“GAP”),117 organiza-
tions committed to rooting out corruption, promoting good government, and pro-
tecting whistleblowers within the federal government and its contractors. POGO’s 
letter of support praised the whistleblower immunity amendment for “explicitly 
protect[ing] whistleblowers who disclose trade secrets confidentially to the govern-
ment or in a lawsuit filed under seal.”118 The letter goes on to emphasize that 
“[m]aking sure these whistleblowers are free to come forward without fear of retal-
iation or of prosecution for trade secret theft is an important and necessary clarifi-
cation, given the current interpretation of relevant law.”119 
GAPS’s letter characterized the amendment as providing “immunity for judi-
cially-controlled disclosures of trade secrets to court in relevant lawsuits.”120 GAP 
noted that the provision’s “approach to responsibly completing the record is con-
sistent with Whistleblower Protection Act boundaries, and it should contribute to 
justice.”121 The GAP letter emphasized that “the amendment’s impact could be 
ground breaking” for “whistleblower rights advocates.”122 
Our nation has 58 whistleblower laws for public and private sector 
employees, more than any other country. But all limit protection to em-
ployment retaliation. As a result, as employment rights have strengthened, 
government agencies increasingly have shifted to criminal investigations 
and sometimes prosecutions as the most common forms of harassment. 
                                                          
 115. Id. (indicating that this discussion begins at 48:48 and concludes at 50:52). 
 116. About POGO, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, http://www.pogo.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 5, 
2017) (“Founded in 1981, POGO originally worked to expose outrageously overpriced military spending 
on items such as a $7,600 coffee maker and a $435 hammer. In 1990, after many successes reforming 
military spending, including a Pentagon spending freeze at the height of the Cold War, POGO decided 
to expand its mandate and investigate waste, fraud, and abuse throughout the federal government. 
Throughout its history, POGO’s work has been applauded by Members of Congress from both sides of 
the aisle, federal workers and whistleblowers, other nonprofits, and the media.” POGO “is a nonpartisan 
independent watchdog that champions good government reforms. POGO’s investigations into corrup-
tion, misconduct, and conflicts of interest achieve a more effective, accountable, open, and ethical federal 
government.”). 
 117. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, Our History and Mission, https://www.whistle-
blower.org/our-history-and-mission (last visited Dec. 3, 2017) (“Our mission is to ensure government 
and corporate accountability by advancing occupational free speech, defending whistleblowers and pre-
senting their verified concerns to appropriate officials, groups, or journalists. GAP has become not only 
the most prominent whistleblower support organization, but also an important government and corporate 
accountability organization both domestically and internationally.”). 
 118. Letter from Danielle Brian, Exec. Dir., Project on Gov’t Oversight, to Chuck Grassley, Chair, U.S. 
Senate, & Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate (Jan. 19, 2016) (on file with the University of 
Missouri School of Law Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Letter from Tom Devine, Legal Dir., Gov’t Accountability Project, to Charles Grassley, Chair, 
U.S. Senate, & Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate (Jan. 20, 2016) (on file with the University 
of Missouri School of Law Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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Corporations have turned to well-financed litigation ‘slap suits’ seeking 
bankruptcy and financial ruin, to achieve a greater chilling effect than 
merely firing a whistleblower. 
The narrow U.S. boundaries to protect freedom of speech have be-
come highly outdated. Almost half the world’s whistleblower laws in 
twelve other nations, from Australia to Serbia, now protect against civil or 
criminal liability. Expanding the scope of protection beyond employment 
harassment is necessary for whistleblower laws to remain relevant. You 
have GAP’s commitment to help advocate that principle not only with 
trade secrets, but any other context where the truth through whistleblowing 
can make a difference.123 
Immediately following this discussion, the Committee unanimously approved 
the amendment. Later that day, Senator Leahy released the following statement: 
Leahy-Grassley Amendment to Protect Whistleblowers Earns Unani-
mous Support In Judiciary Committee 
WASHINGTON (Thursday, January 28, 2016) – The Senate Judici-
ary Committee on Thursday unanimously approved an amendment coau-
thored by U.S. Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Chuck Grassley (R-
Iowa) to ensure that companies cannot intimidate whistleblowers by 
threatening them with lawsuits for trade secret theft. 
Leahy and Grassley have long worked together to strengthen whistle-
blower protections. Their amendment, which was added to the bipartisan 
Defend Trade Secrets Act, protects whistleblowers who share confidential 
information in the course of reporting suspected illegal activity to law en-
forcement or when filing a lawsuit, provided they do so under seal. 
“Whistleblowers serve an essential role in ensuring accountability. It 
is important that whistleblowers have strong and effective avenues to come 
forward without fear of intimidation or retaliation. The amendment I au-
thored with Senator Grassley takes another important step in our bipartisan 
efforts to protect whistleblowers and promote accountability,” Ranking 
Member Leahy said. 
“Too often, individuals who come forward to report wrongdoing in 
the workplace are punished for simply telling the truth. The amendment I 
championed with Senator Leahy ensures that these whistleblowers won’t 
be slapped with allegations of trade secret theft when responsibly exposing 
misconduct. It’s another way we can prevent retaliation and even encour-
age people to speak out when they witness violations of the law,” Chair-
man Grassley said. 
The Leahy-Grassley amendment is supported by the Government Ac-
countability Project and the Project on Government Oversight (POGO). 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act, coauthored by Senator Orrin Hatch 
(R-Utah) and Senator Chris Coons (D-Del.) was unanimously approved by 
                                                          
 123. Id. 
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the committee. Results and a webcast of Thursday’s executive business 
meeting can be found online.124 
The final version of the DTSA incorporated the Grassley-Leahy whistleblower 
immunity provision amendment verbatim.125 The Senate Report accompanying the 
legislation explains that: 
Sec. 7. Immunity [F]rom [L]iability for [C]onfidential [D]isclosure of 
a [T]rade [S]ecret to the Government or in a [C]ourt [F[iling 
Section 7 of the Act amends § 1833 of title 18 by adding a new sub-
section (b). The new § 1833(b)(1) provides for criminal and civil immunity 
for anyone who discloses a trade secret under two circumstances. Subpar-
agraph (A) addresses disclosures in confidence to a Federal, State, or local 
government official, or to an attorney, for the purpose of reporting or in-
vestigating a suspected violation of the law. Subparagraph (B) applies to 
disclosure in a complaint or other document filed under seal in a judicial 
proceeding. The Committee stresses that this provision immunizes the act 
of disclosure in the limited circumstances set forth in the provision itself; 
it does not immunizes [sic] acts that are otherwise prohibited by law, such 
as the unlawful access of material by unauthorized means. 
Section 1833(b)(2) created by this Act provides that an individual who 
files a lawsuit against an employer for retaliation for reporting a suspected 
violation of the law may disclose a trade secret to an attorney for use in the 
proceeding, provided the individual files any document containing the 
trade secret under seal and does not disclose the trade secret other than 
pursuant to a court order. 
Section 1833(b)(3) requires notice of the immunity in this subsection 
to be set forth in any employment contract that governs the use of trade 
secrets, although an employer may choose to provide such notice by refer-
ence to a policy document setting forth the employer’s reporting policy for 
a suspected violation of the law that provides notice of the immunity. An 
employer may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney’s fees under 
this Act against an employee to whom such notice was not provided. The 
notice requirements apply to contracts entered into or updated after the 
date of enactment of this subsection. 
Section 1833(b)(4) defines the term ‘employee’ to include any indi-
vidual performing work as a contractor or consultant.126 
On April 4, 2016, the Senate passed the DTSA on a unanimous vote.127 Senator 
Leahy’s remarks on the Senate floor that day summarized the whistleblower im-
munity provision’s rationale and notes a source for its approach and language: 
                                                          
 124. Press Release, supra note 4. 
 125. Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. 114-153, § 7, 130 Stat. 376, 384–85 (2016) (to be codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1833). 
 126. S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 13 (2016). The House Report contains identical explanatory language. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 16–17 (2016). 
 127. Richard Cowan & Andrew Chung, Senate Unanimously Approves Trade Secret Bill, REUTERS 
(Apr. 4, 2016, 12:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-secrets/senate-unanimously-ap-
proves-trade-secrets-bill-idUSKCN0X11Y3. 
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Today, the Senate voted on legislation that will provide a valuable tool 
to protect against trade secret theft. This legislation is supported by busi-
nesses from diverse sectors of our economy, including companies large 
and small. . . . The Defend Trade Secrets Act contains a bipartisan provi-
sion I offered with Senator Grassley to ensure that employers and other 
entities cannot bully whistleblowers or other litigants by threatening them 
with a lawsuit for trade secret theft. The provision protects disclosures 
made in confidence to law enforcement or an attorney for the purpose of 
reporting a suspected violation of law and disclosures made in the course 
of a lawsuit, provided that the disclosure is made under seal. It requires 
employers to provide clear notice of this protection in any nondisclosure 
agreements they ask individuals to sign. This commonsense public policy 
amendment is supported by the Project on Government Oversight and the 
Government Accountability Project and builds upon valuable scholarly 
work by Professor Peter Menell.128 
On April 27, 2017, the House of Representatives passed the DTSA by a margin 
of 410 to 2.129 President Obama signed the DTSA into law on May 11, 2016.130 
VI.  INTERPRETING THE WHISTLEBLOWER IMMUNITY PROVISION 
As reflected in the foregoing legislative history, Congress built the DTSA’s 
whistleblower immunity provision on the scholarly foundation laid in “Tailoring a 
Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection.”131 Hence, companies, whistle-
blowers, counsel, and courts can best understand the meaning, scope, and intention 
behind the immunity provision by reference to the analysis set forth in that article. 
Most importantly, the whistleblower immunity provision is structured as an 
immunity and not a defense. By characterizing the safe harbor as an immunity, Con-
gress shifted the law and legal process from the employer’s advantage to the em-
ployee and the public’s advantage. The immunity is based on the concern that cor-
porations can “bully” and deter potential whistleblowers through the threat of costly 
trade secret litigation.132 Hence, courts should allocate the burden of proof on the 
trade secret owner seeking to impose liability on a potential whistleblower and re-
solve the applicability of the immunity provision expeditiously. 
Bare allegations that a current or former employee or contractor possesses trade 
secret information and might disclose such information to the press or a competitor 
is not a sufficient basis for allowing a trade secret action to proceed. Nor is the 
assertion that the defendant is unaware that the former employee has provided any 
information to the government a sufficient basis to allow a trade secret action to 
proceed. The False Claims Act, the Dodd–Frank Act, and various other whistle-
                                                          
 128. 162 CONG. REC. S1636 (2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 129. Jacob Gershman, Congress May Be About to Shake Up Trade Secret Law: Is That a Good Thing?, 
WALL STREET J. (Apr. 27, 2016, 4:24 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/04/27/congress-may-be-
about-to-shake-up-trade-secret-law-is-that-a-good-thing/. 
 130. The White House, supra note 2. 
 131. See Menell, supra note *. 
 132. 162 CONG. REC. S1636 (2016). 
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blower statutes and protections specifically authorize the government and whistle-
blowers to investigate potential violations of law without the knowledge or inter-
ference of the target company.133 
Thus, the court’s role at the outset of a trade secret case is to decide whether 
immunity applies, with due regard for the DTSA’s protected activities and public 
purposes. Where the employee asserts under oath that she or he disclosed company 
documents to government officials or an attorney in confidence solely for the pur-
pose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law, the DTSA whistle-
blower regime requires the employer-trade secret owner to come forward with con-
crete evidence that the employee or contractor has shared trade secret information 
outside of the protected categories or for an impermissible purpose. Absent such 
evidence, the employee or contractor remains free to work with counsel to investi-
gate and report alleged violations of law and immune from suit for trade secret vi-
olations.134 
Furthermore, although the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision does not 
bar suit for a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), theft, tres-
pass, or hacking,135 the scope of the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision ex-
tends to trade secret-based harms. Thus, companies cannot impose trade secret dam-
ages on a potential whistleblower who falls within the DTSA immunity ambit 
through a theft or trespass cause of action. If DTSA immunity applies, then the harm 
in such other causes of action is limited to the cost of the paper, ink, or laptop com-
puter that was allegedly stolen or damaged, and cannot extend to the value associ-
ated with information contained on such media or device. Otherwise, the very 
chilling effects that Congress sought to prevent through the DTSA whistleblower 
immunity provision would be circumvented through these other causes of action. 
                                                          
 133. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012) (“The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under 
seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.”); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(h)(2) (2012) (subject to certain exceptions “the Commission and any officer or employee of the 
Commission shall not disclose any information, including information provided by a whistleblower to 
the Commission, which could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower” and 
requiring other regulatory entities with which information is shared to also maintain the confidentiality 
of information). 
 134. Unfortunately, the first reported case to address the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision im-
properly treated the safe harbor as a defense. See Unum Group v. Loftus, 220 F. Supp. 3d 143, 147 (D. 
Mass. 2016); Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act, 1 NEV. L. REV. F. 92, 97 (2017). 
 135. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1833(b)(5) (West 2016). Indeed, civil and even criminal allegations under the 
CFAA are sometimes raised when no actual “hacking” is involved. This practice was questioned by the 
Ninth Circuit where the court interpreted the CFAA narrowly, emphasizing that the text and legislative 
history of the CFAA suggest its “general purpose is to punish hacking—the circumvention of techno-
logical access barriers—not misappropriation of trade secrets.” United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 
863 (9th Cir. 2012). This view was adopted by the Fourth Circuit where the court declined “to contravene 
Congress’s intent by transforming a statute meant to target hackers into a vehicle for imputing liability 
to workers who access computers or information in bad faith, or who disregard a use policy.” WEC 
Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012). Although the proper interpre-
tation of the CFAA in this context is still a matter of controversy (including a circuit split), and beyond 
the scope of this article, the logic of the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision extends to circum-
stances in which an employer asserts criminal or civil liability under the CFAA based on an employee 
breach of contractual restrictions. 
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